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Comparing the incomparable
Different logics, different computers?
The Church-Turing Thesis is one of the great success stories in
twentieth-century analytic philosophy and mathematical logic. It is
a harmonious conceptual and formal analysis of what it means
for a procedure to be, in principle, computable. But it is now
the twenty-first century. There is now a great variety of logics
[Priest, 2008], some proposed as serious rivals to classical logic
(e.g. [Beall, 2009]; [Field, 2008]; [Routley et al., 1982]); or, even more
daringly, as genuinely co-equal notions of logical consequence
[Beall and Restall, 2006]. With this plurality of logics in view, it be-
comes plausible that there could be a corresponding plurality of no-
tions of computation [Sylvan and Copeland, 2000].1
Initially, one would want to know the status of the Church-Turing
Thesis (CTT) in non-classical settings, to know to what extent the clas-
sical theory of computation survives under change of logic. But — and
this is the main point of our paper — the question is itself sensitive to
changes in logic. Before we can answer it, we need some guidelines for
how we should even go about asking. Setting up a fair test for viabil-
ity requires some fixed reference to test against, but fixing a reference
(for instance, insisting that any legitimate proof relation must be unde-
cidable) inherently privileges some frameworks over others. How can
we test, with minimal bias, which non-classical logics support a robust
notion of computation?
On the plurality of logics
The Church-Turing Thesis is an instance of a more general project, of
taking informal philosophical notions and making them formally pre-
cise. The informal notion of logical consequence or validity has been a
similar center of a such a project. But unlike the consensus story of
the CTT, after over a century of research in non-classical logic, there
1. Our discussion is orthogonal to the literature on hypercomputation; see
[Copeland and Sylvan, 1999], [Ord and Kieu, 2005].
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is a growing sense that this plurality of logic is to be taken seriously.2
The idea has emerged that logical validity itself may be polysemous, a
cluster concept [Shapiro, 2014]. One need not be a radical to recognise
that there is earnest disagreement amongst learned people on what is
necessary and sufficient to determine validity — that non-classical log-
ics have “been seriously proposed by (a minority of) expert logicians,
and rationally debated” [Williamson, 2012]. These divergent theories
are “studied by mathematicians whose credentials can hardly be chal-
leneged” [Shapiro, 2014, p.38]. It is not a big leap from here to the (pes-
simistic?) induction that there is, as Smith puts it [Smith, 2011, p.27],
no hope for a[n] argument to show that our initial inchoate, shift-
ing, intuitions about validity — such as they are — succeed in
pinning down a unique extension.
Smiley [Smiley, 1998] offers a nice image: “[T]hose who blithely appeal
to an ‘intuitive’ or ‘pre-theoretic’ idea of consequence are likely to have
got hold of just one strand in a string of diverse theories.”
Logical pluralism is often contrasted with the absolutism of compu-
tation; as it is often presented, the CTT would be a highly unusual
example in the history of science, where it is much more common
that multiple non-equivalent models fit the data [Shapiro, 2014, p.47].
But this contrast does not withstand much scrutiny, as we will see. As
Shapiro puts it [Shapiro, 2014, p.48],
It seems counterproductive — to the philosophical and scientific
purposes at hand — to insist that [other models of computabil-
ity] are incorrect, and should give way to the One True Model
of computability. It might be better to think of [alternatives] as
different ways to sharpen or model the intuitive notion.
If consequence may be plural, then computability may be, too.
2. It’s even been in the newspaper [Williamson, 2012]. Cf. [Williamson, 2014].
Frameworks and convergence
Let us call the combination of a logic and foundational theory a frame-
work. Different frameworks deliver different results (see 2.2 below), so
it is natural to ask about the prospects for comparison. Computability
is a particularly useful case study: it serves both as a good example and
a baseline requirement for a reasonable foundation. If a foundation is
able to capture computability, it can represent the syntax of languages
and replicate mechanical manipulations thereof.
It is not yet clear if many non-classical frameworks can do this.3
While employing logics weaker than classical is known to avoid the
semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes generated by “naive" principles
of truth and set theory, much less is known about how well the revised
logics make for an effective foundations.4
The most compelling evidence for the Church-Turing Thesis has
been convergence theorems, which show that all known formalisations
of computation are equivalent. On the one hand, we are highly sympa-
thetic to the idea that any logical foundation must deliver on a theory
of computation, in the form of convergence theorems; this is a reason-
able test for the viability of a proposed framework. On the other hand,
we are highly sympathetic to the idea that robust non-classicality about
logic can give rise to incomparable but serious notions of computabil-
ity; in which case, if the CTT turned out to be a peculiarly classical
result, its importance becomes more limited.
We will show the limits of pinning down adequacy conditions for a
non-classical system in as neutral a fashion as possible. How to do this
without begging questions is a very difficult problem. Even if one
framework were, from its own perspective, properly stronger than an-
other and able to represent the other as a sub-theory, we argue that this
does nothing to advance the conversation, since from the perspective
3. Some "proof of concept" results are in [Bacon, 2013].
4. The non-classicist chimes in that, in light of the paradoxes, it is not clear
how well classical logic facilitates the development of an effective foundation —
but we leave this aside; see [Priest, 2006, ch.1–3]. For one of the more developed
non-classical foundations in naive set theory, see [Brady, 2001].
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of the “sub"-theory, the “stronger" theory is simply false. (And there
is nothing very impressive about a false theory being able to imitate
in parts a true one.) Simply having this problem in detailed view can
help the conversation move forward. Our goal is not to finish the story,
but rather to lay the dialectical groundwork to tell it.
1. The Church-Turing Thesis revisited
To begin, let us look at the CTT and what is required to establish it.
1.1 The idea of the CTT and its justification
As is well-known, the Church-Turing thesis provides a bridge between
informal and formal notions of computation. So, to start, we first need
a couple of definitions.5
Definition 1 A function is informally computable if it takes a finite
amount of input and can be calculated by an ideal person in a finite amount
of time on a finite amount of paper by following a finite set of instructions.
This informal definition is given using mathematically imprecise no-
tions like ‘ideal person’, ‘calculated’, ‘paper’ and ‘instructions’ — to
say nothing of ‘finite’. In contrast, the formal definition is much less
vague (pending a definition of ‘Turing machine’).
Definition 2 A function is formally computable if there is a Turing ma-
chine that can compute it.
The Church-Turing Thesis is then the substantial claim that the math-
ematically precise definition captures a philosophically nebulous con-
cept:
CTT All informally computable functions are formally computable
functions.
5. These are really two definitions of computation, rather than definitions of
two different kinds of computation.
There are a few ways to argue the CTT. From the armchair, the con-
ceptual analysis involved in defining a Turing machine is a kind of ar-
gument showing that any informally computable function is formally
computable. Empirically, many observe that after almost eighty years
of robust research, no counter-examples (putatively, a function that is
informally computable but not formally computable) have emerged
(see [Copeland and Sylvan, 1999], [Smith, 2007, ch.34]).
The most compelling evidence by far, though, is from convergence.
There are many different ways of formally representing computable
functions: Turing machines; µ-recursive functions; register machines;
Kleene’s equational characterisation; and λ-calculus. Despite this di-
versity, they can all be shown to give the same results. Every way that
people have come up with to capture the informal notion of computa-
tion has turned out to be equivalent.
To illustrate, and to make the discusssion ahead more concrete, let
us see that any Turing machine can simulate any register machine, and
vice versa. A Turing machine:
• operates upon an infinite tape of cells which contain finitely many
cells marked “1" and the rest blank
• can move left, move right, write, and erase
The machine is given instructions in the form of an algorithm, which is
a set of instruction-quadruples each composed of: a label; the contents
of a cell; a basic operation to perform; and a label for the next action
to execute.6 A register machine
• operates upon a finite number of buckets
• can move stones from one bucket to another
Turing machines operate on a piece of tape, while register machines
move stones between registers. To compare them, we find a way for
6. An additional requirement is consistency: an algorithm does not lead to
more than one output; we will revisit this assumption later. For details, see
[Rogers, 1967, p.13–15]; [Smith, 2007, p.290].
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Turing machines to represent register machines and a way for register
machines to represent Turing machines. Suppose a register machine’s
starting state consists of three registers containing two, five and seven
stones respectively.
B1 B2 B3
2 5 7
In order to simulate the register machine on a Turing machine, rep-
resent this on the tape:
1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Then for every possible register algorithm, we prove by induction
(starting from the small initial number of operations) that there is a
Turing algorithm which replicates it. Similarly, in the other direction,
we show a way of representing the computation space of Turing ma-
chines using register machines,7 and a way of mimicking any Turing
algorithm by a register algorithm. All up, with both directions of rep-
resentation given, Turing machines and register machines converge.
1.2 Convergence in general: FAC-structures
Let’s look at this from a more general perspective, to get at a tool for
considering formal analyses of computation and their role in establish-
ing convergence theorems. There are three key components involved
in a formal analysis of computation:
7. To do this we represent the state of the tape as a number and then place
this number of stones in the first register. For example, suppose the initial
statement of the tape was as follows:
1 - 1 1 - 1 1
Then, working backwards and representing blanks by 0s, we get 1101101 which
we take as a numeral. In base-2, the number is represented as 26 + 25 + 23 +
22 + 20 = 109.
1. a space for the computation;
2. a list of possible ways of manipulating the computation space; and
3. a list of possible instruction sets.
The space of computation can be represented as the collection of states
which a computation could reach; to use a little set-theoretic vocabu-
lary, the collection of states is represented as a set, X. We then repre-
sent ways of manipulating the space with a set F of partial functions
f : X ⇁ X.8 And finally, we shall have a set I of instructions for ma-
nipulating the space, algorithms. We then write
A = 〈X, F, I〉
to represent a particular formal analysis of computation and call this a
FAC-structure. Returning to the Turing example: the different states of
the Turing tape would be X; F is the set of functions taking the Turing
tape from one state to another; and I is the set of possible instructions
for Turing machines.9
A flag: We have started talking about sets. But in any standard set
theory, there are no sets which are Turing tapes or register buckets! So
already at this level, a non-trivial amount of machinery is being called
upon for representation; we return to this point in 2.1 below.
With FAC-structures in hand, we may characterise convergence be-
tween models of computation as follows:
8. That is, functions that do not return an output in X for every input from X.
These functions must be partial, since some sets of instructions are insufficient
always to determine an output; though see 2.2.3 below.
9. For any algorithm a ∈ I, there will be exactly one partial function f ∈ F
which is such that for any input state x, f (x) is the correct output state that
occurs (if there is one) when a is correctly followed. There may, however, be
more than one algorithm representing any particular partial function f ∈ F.
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Definition 3 Let A = 〈XA, FA, IA〉 and B = 〈XB , FB , IB〉 be two different
formal analyses of computation. We say that A1 and A2 converge,
A ' B,
if there exist functions
GX : XA −→ XB ; GF : FA −→ FB ; HX : XB −→ XA; HF : FB −→ FA
such that:
1. for all h ∈ FA and for all a1, a2 ∈ XA, h(x) = y iff GF(h)GX(a1) = GX(a2);
and
2. for all g ∈ FB and all b1, b2 ∈ XB , g(b1) = b2 iff HF(g)HX(b1) = HX(b2).
In a diagram:
a2 GX(a2)
a1 GX(a2)
HX(b2) b2
HX(b1) b1
GX
h
GX
GF(h)
HX
HF(g)
HX
g
Informally speaking, G is a formal representation of the way in
which we represent one analysis of computation using another.10 Back-
ground details fixed, the official claim is:
Claim 4 All formal analyses of informal computation converge.
This claim is not a mathematical theorem. Given any pair of FAC-
structures, we may prove that they converge. But there is no mathemat-
ically precise test for which FAC-structures really are a formal analysis
of computation.11 Rather we have an ad hoc enumeration of analyses
provided by experts working independently on the question. And yet
all these analyses turn out to be equivalent. For this reason, the CTT is
widely held to be true.
So goes the standard story. Let us now reconsider matters from a
non-classical perspective.
2. The challenge: a ‘non-classical’ Church-Turing Thesis?
2.1 Reasoning non-classically about buckets and tapes
The CTT presents a challenge for a non-classical logician. The stakes
are high: CTT looks like a true philosophical result, one that has
radically advanced our understanding. The stakes are high enough
that one could reasonably dismiss any purported logico-mathematical
framework for which CTT fails, as having strayed beyond the pale and
not requiring further serious engagement.
10. For example, if A is the Turing machine representation, then a particular
Turing machine can be described by an algorithm a ∈ IA giving a partial func-
tion g ∈ FA. Particular states of the tape can then be represented by x, y ∈ XA.
Now suppose that when presented with state x, the Turing machine repre-
sented by g outputs y; i.e., g(x) = y. Then GX(x) and GX(y) are the represen-
tation of the Turing tape states as states of the registers, and GF(g) is Register
machine corresponding to g.
11. It is not difficult to satisfy the requirements of being a FAC-structure. It is
easy to cook up function sets that are not plausibly computable. We are not
saying that being a FAC-structure in itself gives us a good approximation of
computation. The relationship with informal computation is given by concep-
tual analysis and is not visible from this perspective.
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But how could such a thing even happen? After all, a common
thought is that convergence theorems are proven informally, without
foundational background; cf. [Smith, 2007, ch.34–35]. The reasoning is
in a pre-theoretic, jargony-but-natural language — and since all that
is required is plausibility, not proof, the CTT is established before any
logical paraphernalia even kicks in. Aren’t the tools required for a con-
vergence theorem so simple that we don’t need to lay out our founda-
tional assumptions?
Well, sober as it sounds, it only seems unnecessary to formalise the
CTT argument given a presupposed background, most likely of clas-
sical orthodox set theory, ZFC. That is what most philosophers were
trained in, and it remains an unreflective fallback. But — insofar as
that little bit of pop-psychology is accurate — the very preconditions
for the possibility of a (philosophically interesting) non-classical logic
is that our informal reasoning practices are up for discussion, and we
cannot presume some large settled core like ZFC. After all, it may turn
out that some logics are too weak to argue convergence. To advance
the conversation, we are forced to make our foundations more specific:
to lay them bare.
There are, prima facie, multiple foundational frameworks with
which to approach computation, and so, prima facie, multiple notions
of computation generated. As a first pass for thinking about this ques-
tion, imagine three worlds. In one, classical logic was dominant in the
twentieth century; but in another, fuzzy logic/set theory won the day,
and became the orthodoxy; and in another, intuitionistic logic/set the-
ory was preferred. Then three counterparts of Alan Turing are working
in each world, formulating the notions of “informal effectiveness” and
“recursively computable” in each. Three very natural and very difficult
questions quickly emerge:
1. In which worlds can we, from outside, see that any formalisations
of computability will be equivalent?
2. In which worlds can it be proven, from inside that world, that “all
formalisations of computability are equivalent”?
3. In which worlds can it be represented what is going on in other
worlds?
To foreshadow section 3, a way of understanding what is at stake
here is through the de re/de dicto distinction [Quine, 1976]: roughly, the
difference between “outer" and “inner" quantification: “there is some-
thing that I can prove to be such-and-so" versus “I can prove there is
something that is such-and-so". One might hope that frameworks may
be compared by evaluating claims of the form:
For any two formalisations of computation, framework F proves
that they are equivalent.
For this to work, mathematical objects must be stable across frame-
works, allowing the claims to be de re. But the frameworks are foun-
dational. They determine (or at least characterise) their respective do-
mains of mathematical objects; different frameworks may have differ-
ent domains. This makes it look like the claims should be:
F proves that any two formalisations of computation are equiv-
alent.
We cannot shift from de dicto to de re claims here: the second formula-
tion does not imply the first, unless the relevant notions can come out
from the scope of a provability operator.
The main burden of this section is to provide evidence that no such
shift should be expected.
2.2 The instability of mathematical objects across frameworks
How radical could a non-classical foundational framework be? A ma-
jor difference will be the objects recognised by a theory: the ontology.
Orthodox ZFC set theory has an ontology, about which other formu-
lations of set theory diverge: about the existence of a universal set,
unrestricted complements, sets that are members of themselves, and
so forth. In a “naive" set theory, there is a set of all sets not members of
themselves — and we all know what happens then; but a non-classical
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logic makes the Russell set tolerable (e.g. [Priest, 2006, ch.18]). Not only
does the ontology of these theories differ, but the range of possible
properties that objects can take on is expanded.
The same kind of shift can be expected in what might be called a
“naive" theory of computability, for example in the infamous halting
problem. Consider the Turing machine
H halts on input x iff (the machine with code name) x does not halt
on input x
Classically, H cannot be a Turing machine: H will halt on pHq iff H
does not halt on pHq, a contradiction. Non-classically, though, we
might want to maintain that any apparently describable algorithmic
process determines a computation, and allow that H exists. Then
its apparently impossible behaviour could be reclassified as merely
novel non-classical properties, e.g. the machine is not deterministic
[Agudelo and Carnielli, 2010]; cf. 2.2.3 below. The point for now is not
what to make of such a bizarre object, only to flag that there are frame-
works in which it might be allowed to exist.
Let us consider a few examples to this effect. In each case below,
some basic differences about logical operators (conjunction, negation,
implication, identity) have drastic down-stream effects for mathemat-
ical objects, like sets and numbers. The sequence of subsections here
shows that what is proved inside a framework may be so divergent that
it cannot be easily transferred between frameworks.
2.2.1 Sets and functions
Sets themselves are theory-laden. For instance, consider a framework
within the linear logic tradition, in which the logical rule of contraction
is not valid: p ∧ p is not equivalent to p; see [Petersen, 2000]. So now,
an exercise: For some set a, is it the case that a = a ∩ a? There’s no
problem with a ∩ a ⊆ a, but for the other direction we’d need to show
that x ∈ a implies x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ a. Without contraction, the identity does
not obtain.
This is a disagreement with the classical theory of sets at the level
of finite intersection, something that could be drawn with a Venn di-
agram. The question: Is a person who is proving the CTT using non-
contractive set theory to represent buckets and tapes using the same
sets?
Similarly, for ordered pairs, one expects
〈a, b〉 = 〈c, d〉 iff a = c ∧ b = d
to obtain. Again, in a non-contractive theory, this may or may not be
possible, beginning with the reduction of ordered pairs: the common
definition {{a} , {a, b}} is not equivalent to the more advantageous
{{{a} ,∅} {b}}, as shown in [Petersen, 2000, p.380]. Since functions —
univocal relations — are developed out of ordered pairs, this opens a
way for more than one non-equivalent notion of ‘function’.12
2.2.2 Numbers and identity
If objects as basic as sets could vary between frameworks, then per-
haps it is not surprising that “the natural numbers" may differ between
frameworks. Consider Peano Arithmetic in the relevant logic R, known
as R# [Meyer and Mortensen, 1984]. This is given by the standard PA
axioms, but with all the material implications replaced by relevant im-
plications. A domain of numbers is described. In relevant logic, it is
possible that, given numbers n, m ∈N, it can be that n = m and n 6= m
are both satisfiable, without it following that 0 = 1. (That would be an
irrelevant inference.) Rather stunningly, then, R# can have finite mod-
els [Priest, 2006, ch.17]. All the expected classical non-identities still
hold — for instance, 1 6= 2 — but it is nevertheless possible that their
negations hold, too. From the classical perspective, it looks like dis-
tinct objects are being mis-identified. From a (deeply committed) R#
12. A most familiar example is constructive mathematics, which since Brouwer
has been been working with a notion of function such that all functions are
continuous [Bridger, 2007, ch.4, appendix 1].
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perspective, one non-self-identical number has been mis-interpreted
as many numbers.
Again the question: Is a person using R# to count the pebbles in a
register machine counting the same way? Do they even mean the same
thing by ‘counting’ as someone using classical PA?
By the same token, one of the conditions on being a Turing machine
is consistency: there are no two outputs p, q of an algorithm on the
same input such that p 6= q. In a dialetheic set theory [Restall, 1992],
there are objects (like the Russell set) such that x 6= x. The consistency
requirement can therefore be met, to the letter if not the spirit of the
law, by a construction in the logic LP [Priest, 1979] where programs
are not (consistently) consistent! Let us skip the details and just get to
the question: Is the LP programmer even writing a program?
2.2.3 Algorithms
A non-classicist is rethinking some of the basic decisions made
in the twentieth century about recursion theory. One such deci-
sion is prompted by a standard diagonal argument, saying that
some procedures do not determine a function, but only a partial
recursive function. Following [Rogers, 1967], Sylvan and Copeland
[Sylvan and Copeland, 2000] use the same facts to argue instead for a
“paradox of all algorithms". Consider a list of all computable functions
in one argument f0, f1, ..... Consider the function
g(z) = fz(x) + 1
This is a computable function: to compute it, first compute fz(x)
and then add 1. Therefore it is on the list of all computable functions:
g = fk for some k. At which point
fk(k) = g(k) = fk(k) + 1
Sylvan and Copeland conclude from this that the list of all com-
putable functions is inconsistent — that “there are more algorithmic
functions than all algorithmic functions” (p.194), and, for good mea-
sure, there may be some natural number such that n = n + 1 (which
sounds absurd, but would be technically possible in paraconsistent
arithmetic [Priest, 2006, ch.17]).
Orthodox recursion theory of course has a reply to this line of
thought [Rogers, 1967, p.11]. Our only point at the moment is that, to
the extent that what they propose is cogent, Sylvan and Copeland are
heading for a very unorthodox notion of ‘computable function’. With-
out rashly ruling out their approach a priori, we can ask: Is someone
who takes it to be decidable whether or not a set of instructions con-
stitutes a total recursive function working with anything like classical
recursive functions?
2.3 Taking plurality seriously
From an orthodox standpoint, it is tempting to answer all the above
questions rather swiftly. Someone who takes “functions" (with scare
quotes) to be inconsistent is not talking about functions (no scare
quotes); “sets" without contraction are multi-sets, not sets; etc. The
justification for this swift appraisal is that classical ZFC objects just
are sets, classical ZFC’s ω just is the natural numbers, and in general,
ZFC objects are canonical mathematical objects. Any other objects, like
those described above, may exist, but are e.g. some sort of multi-sets,
or fragment of the numbers, or something else entirely — but certainly
not genuine sets or numbers! This attitude is tempting because it organ-
ises otherwise alien practices in a familiar way. It might be described
as the principle of charity, to say with Quine that deviants do not
change the logic, but only the subject [Quine, 1986, p.61–94]. Let us
urge against charity here.
2.3.1 Translations?
There is nothing wrong with rephrasing unfamiliar notions into a fa-
miliar language, to make them accessible. But it would be a mistake
— “dogmatic and pointlessly controversial” [Williamson, 2014, p.214],
says Williamson — to exclude the original intent as mistaken, or think
philosophers’ imprint - 8 - vol. 16, no. 13 (august, 2016)
toby meadows zach weber Computation in Non-Classical Foundations?
that this rephrasing can dispense with the original, un-reconstructed
idea. Translation theorems can suggest that, e.g., intuitionistic nega-
tion is really just the ¬p of the classical modal logic S4 (for which it
is obvious that
p ∨¬p
fails; not everything is either true or necessarily false). But this is hardly
a fair explication of Brouwer’s intuitionism; if an S4 frame is used
to model intuitionistic arithmetic, for example, there is a (platonistic)
completed infinity at every node of the frame [Shapiro, 2014, p.34–35].
Be it ‘negation’, ‘set’, or other crucial notion, insisting that the non-
classical object is really a crypto-classical object is to reduce this entire
literature to a merely verbal dispute. Lewis cautions that
to suppose that [a non-classicist] mistakes mere terminological
difference for profound philosophical disagreement is to accuse
him of stupidity far beyond belief [Lewis, 1990, p.30].
Just because one can interpret another’s language does not mean that
interpretation is semantically faithful. There’s a world of difference be-
tween an interpretation where terms and descriptions are in harmony,
and an interpretation done upon some abstract scratch pad in some dis-
used corner of one’s foundational framework; cf. [Shapiro, 2014, ch.4].
Cross-framework foundations is not the place for invoking overly
charitable principles of charity. If we disambiguate by giving away
names (there is classical negation, intuitionistic negation, dialetheic
negation, etc.;) then the dispute is not about names, but reference:
Which one delivers the correct theory of negation? Of sets? Of com-
putation? These are substantive questions that cannot be translated
away.
2.3.2 Classical default?
The standing offers for cross-cultural discourse in the literature assume
that, by and large, classical logic is perfectly fine and safe to use. This
idea is invoked particularly at the level of metametatheory — that is,
the plane of reasoning between frameworks. For example, Bacon has
developed an algebraic metatheory for non-classical theories that is
itself, purportedly, non-classical. But there is a caveat:
I am assuming that the theory of syntax would be free of the
kind of phenomena responsible for nonclassicality, allowing one
to assume classical logic about syntax [Bacon, 2013, p.347, fn12].
All the main strategies on offer are some variation on this thought.
For example, Field, in the context of giving a non-classical account of
validity, writes:
the non-classical logician needn’t doubt that classical logic is
“effectively valid" in the part of set theory ... [that] suffices for
giving a model-theoretic account of validity for the logic that is
at least extensionally correct [Field, 2008, p.109].
If we are confident that the domain in which we are working is con-
sistent, for example, then ex falso quodlibet can be deployed reliably;
if we can presume bivalence, then double negation elimination is fine;
and metatheoretic reasoning conditions allow for all this.
How tenable is this idea? In [Field, 2008], a paracomplete theory of
truth is proposed. In [Beall, 2009], a paraconsistent theory is similarly
proposed. Both argue that, due to paradox, classical logic is not correct
(in very different ways). Nevertheless, both crucially avail themselves
of classical model theory in ZFC in order to build models of these
theories, in the Kripkean fixed-point style. The problem is simply that
now the justification offered for the theory is not justified according to
the theory itself. So the proffered theory of truth — paid for by a logic
revision, in the hopes of retaining a universal truth predicate — turns
out not to be the whole story about truth. However much one can say
in reply to this charge, it certainly seems bad. A classical meta-theorist
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simply does not take non-classical logic as seriously as the rhetoric
elsewhere insists one should.13
An all-else-fails suggestion is that the non-classicist can view the
ZFC models as a temporary communication device, a ladder for climb-
ing up over classical accounts that will be eventually kicked away. Let
us simply assume (quite an assumption) that with enough work it
could be shown that a classical framework can build up and legitimate
a non-classical framework. What would it show? Suppose the non-
classicist is asked to justify various aspects of their formalism, to repro-
duce the arguments (from ZFC model theory) that underlie their the-
ory; then there are two possibilities. Either the proofs were inherently
classical, involving reasoning that cannot be recast, in which case the
non-classicist cannot justify their own position. The underlying classi-
cal results, if only obtainable classically, will always remain classical-
only, and can never be appropriated or used by the non-classicist. Or
else the proofs could have been done in a non-classical setting all along,
in which case there never was need of classical metatheory except as
a façon de parler. One can kick a ladder only once one is safely off of
it; and when it comes to mathematical foundations, being safely off
amounts to having never needed the ladder in the first place.
2.4 The challenge going forward
The discussion of this section leaves us in a difficult position with re-
spect to the Church Turing Thesis. If we wanted to ask our question —
in which frameworks can the notion of computation be developed? —
in a way that treats non-classical logics as toys, to be manipulated by
a classical ZFC-type framework, then this would be a straightforward
mathematical problem. (To be candid, that was the project we origi-
13. Both anticipate the objection, ultimately suggesting that model theory is an
instrumental or heuristic device. In a different vein, Beall and Restall consider
this problem [Beall and Restall, 2006]. Shapiro devotes two full chapters to the
issue in his [Shapiro, 2014]. The common theme throughout is that the worry
is somewhat overblown or misplaced. Nevertheless, the worry is prima facie
very serious — why else would everyone devote space to explaining why it is
not? — and this is sufficient for our purposes.
nally intended to take on.) But it would operationally presuppose that
the classical framework is the arbiter of truth. While there is no doubt
we can make toy interpretations of non-classical frameworks under a
classical framework, working that way would divest the question of
much philosophical interest.
Shapiro suggests that working in this ‘eclectic’ spirit is not so dif-
ficult, after all: “Usually, it is not hard to keep one’s perspective”
[Shapiro, 2014, p.209]. We are less sanguine. If one is genuinely en-
tertaining different frameworks, then matters become genuinely con-
fusing. Nevertheless, flying without a safety net is worth the risk. It
promises more insight into the nature of computation, its philosophi-
cal analysis, logic, and limits. It is in this spirit that we now proceed.
3. Towards a framework for comparison of frameworks (when there
can be comparison at all)
Our goal is to take pluralism in foundations seriously. With this in
mind, let us now return to our main problem: the Church-Turing
Thesis and convergence theorems. In this section we shall provide a
clear way of highlighting the distinction between de dicto and de re ap-
proaches to comparison of FAC-structures (section 2.3), and what is
required to make a plausible representation of them.
3.1 Convergence revisited
Let’s try to make the foundational background behind the convergence
argument more explicit. The orthodox way to formulate Claim 4 (all
formal analyses of computation are equivalent, therefore CTT) using
our apparatus of frameworks and FAC-structures is as follows:
Claim 5 (ZFC-convergence, de re) Let Γ be the finite set of acceptable formal
analyses of computation that have been produced. Then for all A,B ∈ Γ,
ZFC `CL A ' B.
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Regarding notation, we place ZFC on the left of the ` to indicate that
this is the underlying theory. We place CL to the bottom right of the `
to indicate that the underlying logic is classical. The list Γ will need to
include those analyses listed at the beginning of Section 1.1 and on the
basis of its sufficiency — a philosophical premise — we go on to argue
that CTT holds. We use classical logic and ZFC.
Given our goal to compare alternative frameworks, we might gen-
eralise Claim 5 as follows:
Problem 6 (F convergence, de re) Let F be a framework and let Γ be the
finite collection of acceptable formal analyses of computation that have been
produced. Then for all A,B ∈ Γ,
F `F A ' B.
This time we have written F both to the left and to the bottom right of
the `, to mean the axioms and logic of F respectively. We might then
think that if F is in a position to solve Problem 6, then it could be in a
good position to mount the standard convergence argument and claim
CTT; and if not, then computability according to F is going to look
very different. However, this is exactly the point that we should not
rush off to start comparing and contrasting foundational frameworks.
The formulation of Problem 6 is too ambitious. It presupposes that
notions such as ‘finite collection’ are invariant across frameworks. So
far, we have given several reasons to doubt that this assumption holds.
In the classical ZFC framework, we’ve explained how to represent for-
mal analyses of computation, but we have not said how to do this for
frameworks in general.14
14. More explicitly: When trying to formalise the standard approach to conver-
gence theorems in Section 1.2, we adopted some set-theoretic tools to provide
an algebraic representation of formal analyses of computation, and we noted
some possible issues with this move. When we represented, for example, Tur-
ing’s model of computation using a FAC-structure A = 〈X, F, I〉, X didn’t
really contain particular states of a tape, but rather a set-theoretic surrogate
which contains objects which are isomorphic to states of a tape: they contain all
Corresponding to our de re formulation above, one can address the
convergence problem in a de dicto fashion. In the context of the classi-
cal ZFC framework, we simply forget about the informal notions of a
formal analysis of computation and use the FAC-structures instead:
Claim 7 (ZFC-convergence, de dicto) Let Γ be the set of acceptable FAC-
structures. Then
ZFC `CL ∀A,B(A ∈ Γ ∧ B ∈ Γ⇒ A ' B).
What is the difference between Claim 5 and Claim 7? On the outside
of the ZFC context, in Claim 5, we are talking about formal analyses of
computation involving tapes and buckets. On the inside of the context,
in Claim 7, we are talking about classical ZFC objects. The move from
outside to inside is a philosophical one — the claim that the FAC-
structures provide a faithful representation of their targets outside the
framework. So, generalising again, the de dicto version of Problem 6
would then be:
Problem 8 (F convergence, de dicto) Let Γ be the set of acceptable represen-
tations of formal analyses of computation according to F . Then
F `F ∀A,B(A ∈ Γ ∧ B ∈ Γ⇒ A ' B)
We should understand Γ here as a list given with the language and
framework of F . Quantification occurs inside the context of the frame-
work.15
Would a positive solution to Problem 8 in some framework show
that CTT held there and that computability in that framework was, in
some sense, comparable to its orthodox understanding? Not obviously.
the information that is required. This move then allows us to take the informal
notion of a formal analysis of computation and represent it by a FAC-structure.
15. Setting aside the (major) issue of restricted quantification with a non-
material conditional.
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There is no reason to think that the list of representations ΓF used
by framework F is in any reasonable way comparable to the list of
representations ΓZFC used by ZFC. This is the point where the limita-
tions of the de dicto result start to squeeze. An alternative framework
may provide a theory of computability which only sounds orthodox. A
framework F1 could accuse F2 of merely proving something that looked
like F1’s result, for example (as per section 2.2.2) by using a single in-
consistent number to simulate many distinct numbers. At bottom, this
is going to be a philosophical point rather than a mathematical one.
There needs to be some agreement between F1 and F2 with regard to
the faithfulness of their respective representation to warrant compari-
son. For two parties to communicate, they have to agree that they are
talking (roughly) about the same thing. Doing de dicto comparisons by
taking a framework at its word is only as good as that framework’s
word.16
3.2 The conditions for de re comparison: arguing about sets and reals
One might hope that FAC-structures are simple enough to be invariant
across frameworks. This hope is unrealistic. Even for two frameworks
that agree on almost everything, there are significant hurdles for com-
parison, as we will now illustrate with an example. From this we shall
learn that we should choose the objects from which we construct our
representations very carefully.
Consider a disagreement between two proponents of classical ZFC,
who are at odds over how many ordinals there are. We start from here
to show that even under extremely favourable conditions, namely, agree-
ment about logic and a vast amount of ontology, the difficulties of
comparison still emerge. Let F1 be classical ZFC plus the assumption
16. It is at least possible for a framework to incorrectly self-report. A framework
couched in a dialetheic arithmetic could prove ∃A,B ∈ Γ ¬(A ' B) even though
it also proves ∀A,B ∈ Γ A ' B. This could be due to the subtleties of how the
equivalence relation is defined, or facts about which collapse model was used
[Priest, 2006, ch.17]; but the main point is that, paraconsistently, ∀xp and ∃x¬p
do not rule each other out.
that there is an inaccessible cardinal; and let F2 be classical ZFC plus
the assumption that there are no inaccessible cardinals. Moreover, let
us assume that the adherents of F1 and F2 have roughly the same re-
alist attitude toward set theory. They both take it that their axioms are
correctly describing an ontology of sets which is, so to speak, out there
and logically prior to its description.17
It is well-known that from the perspective of F1 one can produce a
relatively natural interpretation of the F2 framework. Supposing that κ
is the first inaccessible cardinal, F1 can procure a set Vκ which provides
a model for the F1 framework; i.e., Vκ is a model of the theory ZFC and
the statement that there are no inaccessible cardinals [Kanamori, 2003].
This model will allow F1 to simulate anything that F2 can do. On the
other hand, one cannot provide an interpretation of the F1 framework
from the perspective of F2.18 One might be tempted to say that F1
thinks that the ordinals extend further than F2 thinks.
This is not a good way of understanding the situation. It makes
heavy use of F1’s interpretation of F2, but without justifying why this
interpretation is acceptable for making comparisons between F1 and
F2’s representation of the ordinals. This is not to say that there is no
value in F1’s “simulation" interpretation of F2 — it provides a means
of predicting what F2 will say about any given matter — but it is, no
more than an instrument for this purpose. It would be more faithful
to let the terms of one framework denote naturally in the other — a
reasonable condition, given that both F1 and F2 are trying to denote
the same collection with the term “ordinal". It is not that one frame-
work’s ordinals are longer than the other’s; rather each thinks that the
17. We could have considered a more logical example, like the representation of
intuitionistic negation by ¬ in S4 from Section 2.3; but by sticking with sets,
our target comparison is between things rather than language, which makes the
same basic point but without complications about the “referent of negation" or
other such hairy questions.
18. This is for the intuitive reason that F1 is “bigger" than F2, and the technical
reason that F1 has strictly greater consistency strength than F2. Note that the
ZFC framework doesn’t strictly provide an object which is the ordinals, which
should give pause to the orthodox [Shapiro and Wright, 2007].
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other has made a mistake about the existence of a particular ordinal.
Moreover, their disagreement is quite blatant. It can be read straight
off the frameworks themselves, making use of the fortuitous circum-
stances in which each framework is formulated in the same language.
Most starkly, F2 entails that F1 is false. For F2 there is no value in a
model furnished by a framework that is false.19
Stepping back, the lesson is that the more economically we can rep-
resent a formal analysis of computation, not making use of arbitrary
sets, the better our prospects for meaningful comparison across a wide
variety of frameworks. The only method of making good de re com-
parison of theories of computation is to represent formal analyses of
computation in a region over which there is no disagreement, e.g. in
the example just given, below the first inaccessible cardinal.20 The same
descriptions suffice for both parties in the debate. So when it comes to
comparing non-classical frameworks, agreement up to an inaccessible
cardinal is far too ambitious.
But there is no reason to aim so high. A FAC-structure has three
components to represent: a computation space, partial computable
functions, and possible algorithms. Each could be represented by a
set of natural numbers, or, in the case of partial computable functions,
a countable collection of real numbers. The entire FAC-structure can
19. After all, the trivial theory — in which every sentence is held true — con-
tains every other theory as a fragment, but no non-trivialist finds this very
impressive.
20. Strictly, we should say the sets whose rank is below the first inaccessible
cardinal, however, this technical point isn’t particularly relevant here. More
formally, for any sentence of set theory ϕ and any definable ordinal α below
the first inaccessible cardinal, we have
F2 `F2 ϕVα ⇒ F1 `F1 ϕVα .
Vα denotes the family of sets with rank less than α [Jech, 2003]. Regarding
notation, ϕVα denotes the result of binding all the of the quantifiers in ϕ to Vα
[Kunen, 1980]. However, it can be informally read as saying that ϕ is true in
Vα.
then be represented by a single real number, using well-known cod-
ing techniques [Simpson, 1999]. If we can find frameworks that agree
about the real numbers, then we’ll be in a position to make meaningful
comparisons about their respective theories of computation.
And still, representing FAC-structures with a real number is not
economical enough. Let F1 be classical ZFC plus the assumption that
some real number is not constructible; and let F2 be classical ZFC plus
the assumption that every real is constructible [Kunen, 1980]. Each of
these frameworks clearly rules the other out, so they are distinct. Given
that F1 thinks there is a non-constructible real, we might be tempted
to say that F1 thinks there are more reals than F2. Indeed F1 can
provide an interpretation known as the constructible hierarchy, which
models F2 in much the same way as the previous example. But as
with inaccessibles, so with constructibles. First and foremost, F1 and
F2 think the other has got something wrong: F1 says there’s a non-
constructible real and F2 says there isn’t. If F1 simulates F2’s talk
about the reals, it will not be faithful to F2’s intended interpretation.
Both being in ZFC, F1 and F2 will still agree on almost any question of
ordinary mathematics. Yet they have substantively different theories of
the real numbers. If we represent FAC-structures using real numbers,
we may have problems finding counterparts from one framework in
another.
3.3 Representations on the cheap: From reals to naturals
In the case of the classical set theorists disagreeing about reals, we can
restrict our attention to the constructible reals, whence F1 and F2 do
not disagree.21 But such a move is possible only under ideal conditions
21. More formally, for any set-theoretic sentence ϕ, we have
F1 `F1 ϕL ⇒ F2 `F2 ϕL.
Moreover, for any constructible real number described in F1 there is an obvious
counterpart to it in F2. We simply use the same description in F2. As in the
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for de re comparison. What can we hope for common ground between
frameworks in general?
Given our goals of comparing representations between different
frameworks, the best prospects lie in representing analyses of com-
putation as economically as possible. Now, what is good about FAC-
structures is that they anchor us: a fixed representational device gives
us reason to think that what some framework thinks is a Turing ma-
chine is comparable with what another framework thinks is a Turing
machine. The problem with FAC-structures is that they cost too much,
by demanding a great deal of agreement between alternative frame-
works. How low can we go?
Despite the fact that the ingredients of a Turing machine (algo-
rithms, partial computable functions, computation space) can be nat-
urally represented by FAC-structures, in Section 1.1 we were able to
describe them using a finite amount of information. This suggests that
(with a little coding) there ought to be a way of capturing this with a
finite representation, with a mere natural number rather than a real. First,
rather than giving a complete (and infinite) list of all the algorithms,
we might just give the finite vocabulary of the instructions and the fi-
nite set of rules which determine whether or not they are well-formed.
This could be coded by a natural number. Second, rather than giving
(an infinite list of) all the (infinite) partial computable functions, we just
say how the algorithms are supposed to be read and how they are sup-
posed to be implemented. This information again could be coded by a
natural number. The computation space is naturally represented by a
set of natural numbers, but it should be a computable set. Provided a
framework F has some ability to talk about computability, then it will
be able represent the computation space with a Gödel number coding
instructions for how to build it. So we can represent FAC-structures
previous example, we are able to use the simulation interpretation to provide
a region of common ground between the frameworks.
with three natural numbers which are essentially codes for instruc-
tions. We thus obtain a significant amount of compression from a real
number down to a natural number.
There are two observations to make here. First, finite representa-
tions are cheap. Previously with a FAC-structure, we were simply
given all the algorithms and all of the functions as objects within the on-
tology of a particular framework. With this finite representation, how-
ever, we are given the instructions for how to construct those objects
within the framework. We are therefore getting an exterior view of a
framework. To use our planetary metaphor: we, looking at the world
from outside, can see that it has the resources for computation; but
the world itself does not yet have the requisite objects on hand. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the kind of constructions required can be
executed by computable functions. Thus, finite representation requires
a framework capable of capturing a certain amount of computability
theory already. It piggy-backs on the host framework’s ability to repre-
sent computation in order to take the natural number and turn it into a
more natural representative of an analysis. Any framework that is able
to talk about the natural numbers and represent computation will be
able to take such a representation and attempt a solution to Problem
6. In this way we can substantially lower the agreement bar between
frameworks and get into position to seriously consider non-classical
approaches to computation.
3.4 Barriers to comparison still?
No matter how low we manage to set the bar, there is still a level of
agreement that must be met even if we are only interested in solving
the de dicto Problem 8. A framework F must be able to talk about the
natural numbers (even if it merely interprets them)22 and it must be
22. For two frameworks, at the least, we’d want to know that for all Σ01 sen-
tences ϕ
F1 `F1 ϕ ⇔ F2 `F2 ϕ.
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able to talk about computation. Without this, a framework does not
just fail to get into position to address Problem 6; it fails to be able to
do any computation at all. Or, to put it more generously, it will not
do computation in a manner recognisable to more classically oriented
approaches. If, for example, F1 is an ultra-finitist framework and F2
is not, then F2 will have a very different idea of what a partial com-
putable function is. After all, an easy corollary of ultra-finitism is that
all programs halt and first-order logic is decidable, just for example. At
this point it would be reasonable to think that the word ‘computation’
means different things in different frames. Radically different theories
of natural numbers should cause us to wonder if there is deep failure
of common subject matter at the core.
Nevertheless, our cheap representations might seem to be begging
the question. In order to produce a finite representation, we’re assum-
ing that a framework can do some computability theory right at the
beginning. Isn’t that a problem? No. We are trying to establish that
F does computability in just one way, rather than several. This is the
content of of the target convergence theorems, and it is critical to our
everyday mathematical application of computability theory. There is
nothing, in principle, stopping a particular framework from having
several different ways of handling computability; in which case, any
one of them will suffice. The demand that a framework be able to talk
about computation is not trivial, but it does not presuppose the CTT.
Whether there could be even more basic levels, lower than arith-
metic, to resort to in very radical cases — e.g. two frameworks that
only agree up to some finite number n, or a framework that says of
its own proof relation that it is undecidable, but which from a ZFC
perspective is clearly undecidable — may be achievable. And, for all
we’ve said, which collection of “the natural numbers", or some fragment
thereof, must be agreed upon? We leave such negotiations to another
day.
4. Conclusion: Colonialism and courtesy
Computation in different foundational frameworks, when possible at
all, may be compared de dicto with relative ease: just let each framework
say what it has to say about convergence theorems (or lack thereof).
This will give a faithful report on the situation that respects the in-
tegrity of different systems, but without adding much insight. If only
de dicto versions of convergence theorems were provable in F , this
would only establish that from F ’s perspective, its own version of com-
putability theory looks like a theory of computability. Establishing how
the frameworks compare de re would be much more illuminating. In
full generality, though, it does not appear to be possible to answer ab-
solute questions about computation between worlds. As Shapiro sums
it up,
...Nothing prevents a theorist committed to a substantial logic
from studying a range of other logics and learning how they
relate to each other and her own. Nor does it prevent another lo-
gician from taking on a similar study, using a different logic. Nor
does it prevent a third logician from studying how the first two
meta-theoretic projects relate to each other. The three of them
might not be able to share all of their results with each other,
in a straight homophonic manner, but that’s life [Shapiro, 2014,
p.202].
At heart, the problem is about transworld identity: how do we inter-
pret the names and terms of one framework in terms of another? The
canonical approach of rigid designation is not available in these situa-
tions, so an attractive option instead would be something like Lewis’s
counterpart theory [Lewis, 1968]. The idea is to make sense of a plu-
rality of theories the same way we make sense of a plurality of worlds.
When moving from a model of one framework to that of an alterna-
tive, we seek counterparts in the new model which are most similar
to that in the original. A seemingly bedrock requirement is agreement
about (most of the) natural numbers. So worlds that are closer to each
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other with respect to agreement about numbers are more comparable.
Worlds are organised into clusters, and in these local neighborhoods,
some de re comparison should be possible; worlds in clusters that are
vastly far away from each other are too different to say whether or
not computation in one is the same as computation in another. The
similarity metric can be based on level of agreement about the natu-
ral numbers.23 Rather than betraying some pro-classical prejudice, the
minimal conditions we have isolated are just a way to say that for two
people to be able to speak to each other, they need to agree on some
basics; and it does not get much more basic than natural numbers.
We have tried to split the difference between two possible methods.
On the one hand we have a kind of colonial charity, where we absorb our
interlocutor’s framework into our own but without taking its content
seriously. This allows the alternative framework’s statements to come
out, in some weak sense, true, but it can fail to take that framework
seriously as a rival. On the other hand, we have a kind intellectual
courtesy, where we take our interlocutor at their word and interpret
their language as we would our own. On this way of doing things,
our interlocutor’s theory may come out false according to our own
lights, but we have at least paid them the courtesy of respecting their
autonomy. Under particularly favourable conditions there is common
ground between two frameworks, where charity and courtesy coincide;
less so in less favourable conditions.
“When people talk to each other, they never say what they mean,”
says the character of Turing in The Imitation Game (2014). “They say
something else and you’re expected to just know what they mean.”
As elsewhere in life, we each speak from our own perspectives, and
cannot do much more than hope to be understood.24
23. There is a possible revenge problem here — is the similarity relation itself
expressed de dicto or de re? But if this is a problem, it would be a problem for
Lewis too; in which case, we safely ignore it for now.
24. Thanks to audiences at the Institute of Computer Science, Academy of Sci-
ences of the Czech Republic, a Pluralism Workshop at Yonsei University, and
the Otago Logic Group. This research was supported by a Marie Curie Interna-
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